Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
English Faculty Research and Publications

English, Department of

1-1-1974

The Education of the Public Man: A Medieval View
Judson Boyce Allen
Marquette University

Published version. Renascence: Essays on Values in Literature, Vol. 26, No. 4 (1974): 171-188. DOI. ©
1974 Marquette University Press. Used with permission.

The Education of the Public
Man: A Medieval View
by Judson Boyce Allen

W
"

H EN Odysseus comes to the court of King Alkinoos, and betrays himself with tears on hearing the story of the Trojan horse, the king says
to him :
"Tell me why you should grieve so terribly
Over the Argives and the fa ll of Troy.
That was all god's work, weaving ruin there
So it should make a song for men to come."·

Again, when Lear's ruin gathers around him, he is wise enough ·to say that all
this would be "pitiful in the meanest wretch, / Past speaking of in a king" (IV.
vi. 208-9). The combination makes my point-the public man is the man whose
deeds are most eminently worth remembering because he is himself important,
and because the facts about him rise to the perfect decorum of poetry.
This is an unusual claim to make, when the apparent needs of our culture are
for anonymous public servants trained in the practicalities of ·management, able
to work within more and more bureaucratically defined roles, and committed to
the moderate optimism of technical problem-solving. High tragedy, apparently,
should have no place. Yet at the same time public figures, in particular at both
ends of the political spectrum, are learning, by using the power of television, that
their influence grows precisely as they learn to behave in puplic as if they were
characters in a fiction-drama tically, idealistically, violently, at a height of style
which invites, and sometimes achieves, the tragic ending. In the technical realm,
managers are learning that they sometimes deal best with their problems by distancing them to analogy with a model or a game. Charisma and efficiency seem
seldom to occur in the same situations, or in relation to the same people, but the
power of the image, whether it be riot or management game, is becoming
increasingl y clear.
If this be true, then the education of the public man needs be an education in
the handling of images. I shall later claim that there is a hierarchy of images, and
a variety of ways of handling them, and that both are more crucial than present
educational theories and behavioral procedures allow us to realize. Here I shall
simply make one more cla,im-that if the public man needs to handle images, then
the medieval ist, by virtue of the particular piece of the past he professes and the
particular mental procedures which knowledge of that past cultivates, is uniquely
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qualified to advise both the public man and his teachers. To substantiate this
claim will require not only a considerable analysis of medieval facts, but more
important a justification of the analogical logic through which they can be made
to apply. This analysis, and this justification, will constitute the bulk of this paper.
First, however, something should be said of the public man himself, as he is and
has been, and of the actual curriculum of his education.
In his epic of the Roman Civil wars, Lucan observes at one point that "victrix
causa de is placuit sed victa Catoni" (Bellum Civile, I, 128) , implying that the two
opinions were of equal weight. Though Cato held public office, his influence and
power were derived largely from the fact that, in his consummately noble way, he
was right, and everyone knew it. Though the decisions of the powerful and the
current of history disagreed with him, they did so guiltily, weighted by the moral
force of his existence. Cato, then, was a public man because he was an admirable
man; his public character was an aspect of his simple existence as a person.
In a different era and at a different level, Jane Jacobs talk s about public per·
sonalities on whom, and on whose enterprises, the life and activity of city streets
can focus. They are the shopkeepers, residents, or frequenters with whom one
leaves keys or messages, on whom one depends to call the police or intervene
themselves to prevent disorder, to whom one speaks with a sense of the recognition of home turf. They have no particular power, or virtue; they are public men
because they happen to be literally or symbolically useful to private persons who
frequent their neighborhood.
In still another area, when Dante and Virgil face the barred gates of the City
of Dis, fearful of the Furies and cringing from possible sight of Medusa, the angel
of heaven comes "a la porta e con una verghetta ! l'aperse, che non v'ebbe alcun
ritegno" (Inferno. IX, 89-90). At his coming the spirits before whom Dante
quailed fled "Come Ie rane innanzi a la nimica ! biscia per l'acqua si dileguan
tutte" (Inferno, IX, 76-77). Hell observes no law, respects no right. This angel is
a public figure by virtue of sheer power. Here it is divine, a "bored excess of
power"2 before which resistance simply vanishes. In a debased form, the same
function can be found in the official who fixes tickets, or (for a fee) expedites
contracts. It exists in the power of governors to grant pardons to criminals, or jobs
to supporters, or dignity to an occasion.
In this array of examples we have a definition. The public man is a person who
is useful, powerful, and admirable, and who op~rates at both literal and symbolic
levels. As Jacob's example proves, he may operate at low levels of the social
hierarchy, as well as high ones, but the same characteristics apply. Though the
public man as servant may be less absolutely powerful than a neighbor he helps,
he does have the power, expertise, or connections to deliver what he promises.
To put in another way, the public man is a person in society whose activity and
personal significance are needed, effective, and right.
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The problem with modern society is that the public figures we so often confront-bureaucrats, managers, politicians-are seldom effective and needed at the
same time, almost never are they significant as personalities (except for the politician who has the facade of one), and they seem usually to be right only when
they are ineffective or martyred. This fragmentation is, in part, the natural lot of
a humanity which, for purposes of government, it is safest to assume fallen. But
in our own time this fragmentation is deliberately cultivated. The very separation
of powers at the heart of the American system of government is such a deliberate
fragmentation. Congress responds to the needs of constituents; the executive
branch has the power to administer the country under the law; and the courts, in
the name of justice, decide what is right. The same fragmentation operates at
every level of function and value. Conflict of interest laws ensure that managers
of all sorts have no personal interest in what they manage; cost accounting sharply narrows the range of values and symbolic overtones which can be cultivated in
a business or manufacturing process. All these arrangements seem to us so natural,
so much a reflection of the essential givenness of things, that we can be barely
aware of them in any critical way. Our reaction to nepotism, conflict of interest,
judicial legislation, court-packing-to any of the multitude of possible ways people
fail to observe the natural divisions of the world-is an automatic condemnation .
But our condemnation, I shall argue, is more and more wrong.
Our reaction is automatic, not because the world really is or should be divided
as we perceive it, but rather because our normal way of seeing and thinking blinds
us to any possible better world. We have a fundamental assumption behind our
knowing-so far behind that we seldom realize that we assume it-which must
be dragged up and examined and escaped, before we can make any changes that
matter.
This assumption is one which is given to us by the phil9sophy of Descartes.
It is fundamental to the scientific method, and to most of our conscious judgments
of truth. It is that subject and object are separate, and operate on one another.
Disregarding for a moment the inevitable problem of the solipsism, which the
common sense man of action ignores at the price of a certain distortion," we can
see that the public man, like all men of action operating within this assumption,
tends to be a solver of problems connected with efficient cause, because this is
necessarily the organization under which "object" appears to him when divorced
from "subject" in a Cartesian way. There can be no interaction between subject
and object, no applicable universals, no symbiotic relations, no merging; the subject deals with the object either as a thing to be known, or as a thing to be manipulated, or as a thing to avoid. Efficient cause is obvious in the second two ; knowl·
edge, as our enlightened culture has developed, tends to the same end. Appeals
to definition at some Platonic level, genus and differentiae, even the taxonomy of
traditional biology, all seem rather old-fashioned. We know things in terms of
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how they work, or what they do, or what place they have in a developmental or
procedural system.
Thus functions tend to purify. The first thing to go is the person himself. The
public man, above all, must be disinterested. We have elaborate conflict of interest laws to make sure that the public man has no private interest in what he
does. Then there is a further classification, depending on function. We have managers, bureaucrats, advisors, and politicians, that is, people who make things happen, who prevent things from happening, who understand what is happening,
and who symbolize the public opinion of what is happening. The manager and
the bureaucrat, thus, are natural opposites; the advisor's knowledge function
is effective (positively or negatively) as he channels it into the description of
purely technical processes, divorced from values ; the politician is most effective
as a symbol of society's sense of its own virtue when he actually does nothing at
all, that is, while he is running for office.
The natural results follow. Industrial and clerical processes are managed with
unparalled efficiency ; dishonesty, waste, and the innocent distortion often occuring between command and execution are prevented with unparalled thoroughness; the political process has displaced the annual August revival as the popular
ritual for the affirmation of virtue and the denunciation of sin (accompanied by
all the traditional cynicisms, of course); at all levels, the application of the function of the knower-we call it "expertise"-has become so ritually important that
consulting firm s flourish to organize it. And it must be admitted that these public
persons do actually accomplish what they claim to do, precisely that, and no more.
The waste widely denounced in government programs is not money diverted to
enrich a few well-connected people; rather, it is an essentially inconsistent public
reaction to the fact that desired progra ms are very expens·ve. Most industrial products actually do work. The mail is delivered far more efficiently than it was only
two hundred years ago. Experts do know what they are talking about, and frequently predict things which actually happen. Public dissatisfaction with public
processes is based on rising expectations. It is, after all, more acceptable to die of
polio when it is an incurable disease than to die because the drug store happens
to be out of Salk vaccine, even though, in absolute terms, the quality of public
health service is better when the vaccine exists to be available for most people.
The education of these public men-manager, bureaucrat, politician, and ad visor-is at present fairly haphazard. We are in a transitional period, and therefore not consistent. The politician, since he functions merely as the appearance of
a man, saying appropriate things written for him by one of the other three
(usually the advisor), may be educated any way at all-as an actor, as a lawyer,
as a restaurant owner with a supply of axe handles, as a Rhodes scholar. The
others tend to be people with technical training rather than liberal learning.
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IN their very recent past there was a consistent and expected education for public
men, best exemplified by the Oxford course in Greats, and loosely referred to
by all of us as a lib~ral or classical education. As praised by Matthew Arnold, it
is an "endeavor to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the
world." As actually practiced, for the last two millennia, this education consisted
of the study of Latin (and sometimes Greek) literature with a view to the cultivation of wisdom, virtue, and effectiveness in persuasion. The more humanist of
our educationists have regretted the recent passing of this type of education, but
even those who most· passionately wished its preservation have found themselves
fatally vulnerable to charges of irrelevance and unprogressive thinking. For this
irrelevance, Arnold himself calls attention to the foundation, for he calls the "endeavor to learn and propagate" a "disinterested" one.
The problem with educators of the public man is that they have paid too much
attention to curriculum, and too little to the student. It is true, broadly speaking,
that the gross content of the educational curriculum of the upper classes (that is,
people likely to be powerful enough to be "public") did not change drastically in
character from Cicero to Churchill. But the student who studied this curriculum
did change, drastically, in hisaxiOlJIs of life and mental procedure, and therefore
in his relation to what he learned. Historical processes also intervened, to place
the student in a certain important but unappreciated temporal relation to what he
was learning. The contemporary of Cicero, thus, studied a literary culture which,
in spite of its Greek roots, was essentially his own. The modern student of the
classics studies a dead language and a- dead culture, which he can only use by
making such imitations as the Chicago Exposition, or by placing a high value on
the ornamental, disinterested, aesthetic, or liberal in his education. For him,
Homer and Caesar and Cicero and Livy are the life and spirit of an alien culture
greater than his own, which he studies for the sake of a m~ntal, personal training and a cultivation of self and character. The relation between education and
life is as totally discontinuous as is the Cartesian relation between mind and matter. Thus educatiori cultivates the character of the public ' man. The character of
the public man is excluded by conflict of interest laws from his public functions.
The puhlic man operates industrial or governmental process using the specific
skills required. Both toward his public work and his personal education, he is
expected to be "disinterested." Relations do happen, of course, and interests are
involved; but they are by axiomatic definition illegitimate. The medieval student,
very different from modern man and from Cicero's contemporary, studied the
same Latin classics we do, plus some others which were similar but in less good
Latin and from Christian authors. But he related to them in a way radically unlike our own, equally unlike Cicero's, and now gone rather out of fashion. He
related to them analogically.
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This analogical relationship is crucial, but its importance is not properly understood, because we are accustomed to approach the man of the Middle Ages as an
object of research, rather than as a possibly alternative · human being_ Thus we
make one or both of two mistakes. The first is to be preoccupied with medieval
deeds-with the facts of a particular war, or diplomatic mission, or procedure in
the administration of the Exchequer. This preoccupation inevitably leads us to
minimize differences; to believe that because wars and taxes have always been
much the same, that the men who administered or suffered them were also much
the same. The second preoccupation focuses on ideas, and seeks to know precisely
what verbal formulae most neatly summarized what was thought or believed.
Thus Simon de Montfort, in 1265, believed in Parliamentary democracy at least
incipiently. Thus Anselm taught a particular theory of the atonement, William of
Conches believed rather Platonic things about creation, and Dante had imperial
notions of good government. This preoccupation with ideas or doctrines or theses
leads us to maximize differences, usually, because we find ourselves either in disagreement with these people, or unable to see why they thought the argument
important, or both.
What we tend to leave out of consideration is the very factor which would
permit the example of medieval public man to be of modern value-which would
permit the example of medieval public man to instruct his modern counterpart in
the proper way to structure, appropriate, and use his own education-that is, the
medieval sensibility. By this I do not mean what the man of the Middle Ages
thought and felt; I rather mean how he thought and felt-I mean what it must
have felt like to think medievally. When we simply repeat Dante's formula, " In
his will is our peace," we cannot possibly mean what he meant, until we purify
our will of Freud, our sense of God, of Santa-Claus-ism and vagueness, and our
sense of peace of the simple and rather negative quiescence which has replaced
the medieval sense of harmony. Again, we cannot repeat Thomist formulations
without distortion unless we bring to them the discoverer's Aristotelian daring
which brought them under condemnation as heresy_ In all cases, we are only true
to the language when we allow for the sensibility_
I am, of course, aware of the fact that allowing for sensibility is a modern
tendency, doubtless derived partly from relativity, and partly from phenomenology
and other personalist philosophies. But in common sense life, this allowance is
made only in psychological and aesthetic an'as, and in the equally remote physical
realities of sub-atomic and inter-stellar space. I am suggesting that the allowance
be generalized, and that the Middle Ages, which made no conscious allowance,
can help us do it. In this respect, the Middle Ages and our own times are precise
inverses. The Middle Ages received the past in verbal form-stories, proverbs,
dicta, treatises-a nd received it by cultivating in themselves a verbal notion of
truth not well adapted to being practical about everyday sense experience. Their
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belief in the singleness of experience, past and present, was compensated for by a
certain doubleness of mind. Our modern empiricism, on the other hand, is singleminded in its attention to facts, and the facts are largely material ones. Our sensibility needs a hypothetically different observer (i.e. medieval sensibility) to make
clear that reality is not unintelligibly multiple over time, but does make a certain
analogically structured sense.
The doubleness of the medieval mind, ultimately, is an ability to sustain simultaneous belief in definition, and in the existence of an instance of that definitionthat is, it is the ability to believe that the central problem of thought and being is
the problem of universals. This ability, which can fairly be called an analogical or
an allegorical sensibility, involves a number of inter-acting factors .
The first is the fact that medieval men did their work, in thought and action,
in a language other than the one in which they had been born. Throughout the
Middle Ages, all serious learning, speculation, communication, and description
took place originally in Latin, or were translated immediately. Even the vernacular poets, such as Dante and Chaucer, were accomplished Latinists, lovers of
Latin books and of the auctoritas of these books. This fact is of course universally
acknowledged, but I know of no place where its significance for sensibility has
been adequately analysed.'
Medieval Latin was, for all who used it, a second language, self-consciously
learned in school and cultivated from literary models. At the same time it was a
living language---even the insanely luxuriant mannerism of Martianus Capella
was not slavishly rule-bound as was the sterile Latinity of the Renaissance. This
peculiar phenomenon, a living language which has no native speakers, may well
be a unique feature of the Middle Ages-it is certainly unique in Western civilization. Because medieval man spoke two languages, he could never be like the
average American, a chauvinist dupe of an ignorance of tongues; on the other
hand, the Latin which medieval man trusted as the chief vehicle of his received
and expressed truth was never quite just a human language. He could never ask
a living person what the Latin really meant. Everything had to be learned by rule
from books, from grammars, from the literary examples of authors long dead.
The authors were, naturally, received as authorities, partly because they included
examples of good Latin. Thus, whether the text were Jerome's Bible or the work
of some antique pagan, the medieval reader faced a form of words which was,
like its author, defined authoritatively as true before one read it, and therefore
before any possible ratification by experience. The results of this medieval relation
to the Latin language were two : words acquired an extraordinary authority, and
the sense which one had of the workings of his own intellect was distanced as a
paradoxically intimate objectivity.
These two results may well be versions of the same thing: the reification of
language. The intellectual enterprise of learning Latin was conscious, deliberate,
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and bookish. It involved a good deal of careful memorization and supervised drill.
The primers which one read as one learned were a collection of moral aphorisms,
the Distichs of Cato, the collection of morally uplifting beast fables by Aesop
which have not yet completely disappeared from cultural sight, and a book of
Eclogues by Theodulus, in verse with a considerable prose gloss, which presented
a series of pagan and Christian marvels in alternating parallel. From these books
one progressed through a wide range of classical and post-classical literatureOvid, Virgil, Lucan, Cicero, Prudent ius, and others. What one got in all this
reading was ostentatiously and relentlessly human. There were fables, poems,
aphorisms, philosophizing, speeches, histories, in a variety of genres and styles,
prose and verse, high style, middle and low. By and large the school books did
not include purely technical works; one never read simply for information, but
always submitted to and cultivated the style of humanitas. Information was included, of course, but the encyclopedia of the seven liberal arts presented them as
wedding guests at the Ma17iage of Mercul'Y and Philology. Therefore, when one
learned it was by attending to the voices and deeds of radically cultivated men,
and by learning the rules of their cultivation. Thus to think in Latin was to think
artificially. One had to distance one's intellect and one's mental operations precisely to that distance where they could be given and living at the same time.
Because it took place in Latin, thought took on the character of its medium, and
became a living activity with no native actors. That is, educated people cultivated,
naturally and necessarily, a mental life style which was constantly raising the
individual into the condition of the typical. By distancing one's intellect, one
could combine the sense of definition, universal and absolute, and the sense of
instance or example or personal self. By distancing one's intellect into a linguistic
realm which was at once given, living, and cultivatedly human, one gave one's
private and possibly sorry existential self the freedom of thl realm of definitionone made it not only possible but necessary that the bare forked creature man rise,
whenever he spoke, into the condition of humanitas.
For this medieval situation there are at least three modern analogues, which
perhaps should be disposed of immediately, because they are so dangerously perverse. The first is the fictional language of Newspeak, with which Orwell so properly frightens us. The second is the real language of the government document
and the official bulletin, which he finds also horrifying. The third is the mathematicallanguage of computers and its analogues in statistics and logic. All these
are second languages, of a sort, which are learned by rule for the doing of certain
business, which in the way of doing that business are living enough to be altered
in appropriate ways, and which tend to direct the thought patterns of people who
use them extensively. Thus, like medieval Latin, they are living languages, but
they are not and never have been learned by living infants as a primary means of
communication. In their perverse way they also give an extraordinary authority
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to words. But they are the opposite of the medieval man's Latin, because they are
absolutely artificial-because they tend not to be used, as was medieval Latin, for
love letters, poetry, and jokes ; and because they are chiefly used to permit abstractions and purely structural linguistic operations to flourish without interference
from concrete particulars and their human connotations. They are the brutalizing
alternative which faces Cartesian, or ex istential, man; they are definition purified
of humanitas.

THE Latin culture of the medieval man, by which he distanced his intellect
into definition without losing his self-hood in the distancing, gave an extraordinary authority to words. Not only did the most technical and the most highly
regarded medieval processes (such as theology and politics) tend to be verbal; even
more, the corpus of known truth tended to be contained in a relatively small but
varied collection of books defined as authoritative. The resultant sensibility was
not well adapted, as I have said, to the efficient handling of concrete experience.
What it could do to perfection was to harmonize apparently conflicting authorities. What it learned from doing so was an analogical or allegorical habit of mind.
The truth, by definition, was single, simple, and Christian. The received corpus of true authorities, on the other hand, was as varied as classical and Christian
culture. Abelard's Sic et Non, a rigorous and simplistic demand that we line up
our authorities and then decide which among them are wrong, has made him a
hero in certain philosophical eyes, but his warmly doubleminded attempt to love
God and Eloise at the same time is more medieval. Perhaps if he had been singlebodied about the flesh, and double-minded about theology, Bernard would have
liked him better. But however complex the reasons, the Middle Ages rejected
Abelard, and canonized Bernard, and the decision was an affirmation of BothAnd, a rejection of the Either-Or.
,
The corpus of received truth \lvas a collection of books-the most widespread
medieval literary genre was therefore the commentary. Glosses dealt both with
the words and with the men and events to which the words referred; difficulties
were sometimes simply verbal, and sometimes more serious. Always the effort was
to harmonization, to reconciliation, to making it possible ~or all the various things
in the inheritance to be true, and at the same time to say the truth which, under
God, everyone knew was central and essential.
Sometimes the difficulties are relatively small. The great ninth meter of Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy book III, for instance, is a thoroughly Platonic
poem in praise of God and God's orderliness in creation. William of Conches'
commentary is one of the most important and elaborate; in his careful dealing
with even minor problems we can see how thorough was the medieval concern
to save the truth of the received text. For instance, William is at great pains to
understand precisely why Boethius uses the word "perpetua" instead of the word
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"eterna" to describe God's governing reason, or how one could say of God's relation to the world, "das cuncti moveri," when obviously the stable earth does not
move_ The first problem William solves by explaining that though the reason is
indeed eternal with respect to God, it is only perpetual with respect to the world
being governed, because the world has a beginning. The second problem he
solves by an appeal to Aristotle's six kinds of motion: "generatio, corruptio, augmentum, diminutio, alteratio, secundum locum mutatio." Obviously, all things
created move in at least one of these ways. Here, William solves his problems by
making careful distinctions among literal meanings; his attention is concentrated
on the words and what they say, and on the necessity of showing the precise possibilities which permit them to be true.'
Problems involving more serious contradiction the Middle Ages solves by the
use of allegory, a procedure wholly arbitrary and alien to the Cartesian sensibility,
which misunderstands it as a rationalist game. The sensibility of the Middle Ages
compels me to use the term, but at the same time compels me to insist on a rather
different definition for it than the literary, rhetorical, and symbolist ones. 6 Allegory,
as I mean the term here, refers to that habit of mind which deals with being by
arranging it in ordered parallels. Thus the Old Testament is parallel to the New ;
holy history is parallel to-that is, allegorical of-the life of Christ, the moral life
of man, and the life of heaven to come. These are the inevitable four levels:
Littera gesta docet, quod credas, allegoria
Quod agas, tropologia, quo tendas, anagogia.
The same procedure can be used to reconcile apparent contradictions. Anything
in the Bible which does not literally teach charity must do so allegorically, and
one can see this fact by putting the literal story in parallel to some schema of
charity, and developing a large number of one-to-one relationships. By this procedure, one could find unity of doctrine throughout the whole range of inherited
culture. Allegorizations of Ovid's Metamorphoses prove that even the most licentious tales could be assimilated in this manner.
All this is the common knowledge of medievalists. But it needs one final added
twist. One of the levels was tropology-"quod agas," what one must do. The same
procedure of allegorization which reconciled apparent contradictions in the inherited corpus of authoritative words also related the individual, in his own behavior
and sense of himself, to that corpus. History exists as a great array of moral examples, to which one must put oneself as a parallel. Past and present, history and
person, relate to one another not as cause and effect, but as allegory and allegory,
as model and example.
Summarizing then: the sensibility of the educated medieval man was based on
a Latin which distanced his ego into definition, which provided him with a highly
cultivated and poeticized corpus of literature as the container of his received truth,
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and which encouraged allegory as the dominant' mental procedure for dealing
with interior and exterior reality. Not all medieval men, of course, were so culti·
vated, but public men as a rule were. If they were not educated, they were kings
and nobles, whose sacramental existence and daily contact with educated assistants
gave them much the same sensibility.

THE actual educational process which produced this sort of medieval public
man has been most charmingly described by John of Salisbury, in his Meta·
logicon. 7 He gives us ' full details. Bernard of Chartres, "the greatest fount of lit·
erary learning in Gaul," taught by reading literature to his students, explaining
rules of grammar and style, helping his students to imitate what they heard and
memorize choice portions daily. In all their work, students were encouraged in
decorous speech, religious devotion, and moral behavior. The elegance, grace, and
point of John's description, and indeed of all his works, is testimony to the quality
of Bernard's teaching, and John's distinguished public career is testimony to its
pragmatic value. Certain features of this marvelous educational program need
emphasis here, both because they are important to my argument, and because they
have all fallen thoroughly out of favor with contemporary educationists. In the
first place, the teaching was personal. The students had come to Chartres specific.
ally to work under Bernard-the medieval habit of following teachers from place
to place is notable. Second, the teaching emphasized the rules of expression, and
at the same time the imitation of elegant examples of their use. Third, the stu·
dents were encouraged to memorize. Fourth, the object of it all, clearly, was to
make the student a good person-religiously, morally, and practically.
Only as a supplement to this program does logic have its use. John studied
logic under Abelard and others in Paris, and soon grew most conceited with his
skill a'nd knowledge. When he came to his senses, he wen~ to study under the
William whose commentary on Boethius was referred to earlier. Eventually, after
twelve years of various studies, he returned for a visit to the logicians of Paris and
found that they had made no progress in the interim, and were still arguing the
same old questions, ' but with less perspective and restraint than before. John con·
cludes that "just as dialectic expedites other studies, so, if left alone by itself, it
lies powerless and sterile. For if it is to fecundate the soul to bear the fruits of
philosophy, logic must conceive from an external source." The external source, of
course, is the received body of human experience, as preserved in the books of
the past. 8
For the reintroduction of this program of teaching and learning, quite literally,
into the schools of our own day, Dorothy Sayers argues most persuasively. She
claims quite properly that a curriculum of "subjects" leaves students with a store
of information useful in the contexts for which they were taught, but without the
tools for proceeding to learn further on their own, and utterly at the mercy of
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propagandists and well-meaning idiots, however learned, who abuse language_
She therefore recommends grammar, logic, and rhetoric as tool subjects, and
relates them to natural stages in the learning process of the child_ These are, in
her terms, the "Poll-parrot" stages of memorization and assimilation, the "pert"
stage of the objectionable and argumentative older child, and the "Poetic" or creative and self-expressive stages of'the younger teen-ageL 9 Something like the same
three stages are presented, with more ponderous academic rigor and considerably
less style, by Alfred North Whitehead in The Aims of Education_
Both as a medievalist and as a human being who wishes well for education, I
incline' to agree with Miss Sayers, and yet I think, for the education of the public
man, her program would succeed indirectly and accidentally rather than because
of what it centrally proposed to do and be_ Grammar, logic, and rhetoric are the
crucial tools of learning only if the crucial problems to be solved by learning are
verbal ones; it is accidental to the schema, but essential to the result that Miss
Sayers (and I) have in mind that the verbal problems this education actually
worked on were problems involving nobility and high decorum_ Grammar
brought with it great literature, and rhetoric presented the rules of its technical
greatness, while logic was chiefly exercised on metaphysics and on the implications of God_ The result that mattered, both for the Middle Ages and for our use
of their experience, was the human being heightened into definition and accustomed to thinking allegorically_
It is a fact of intellect that a culture eventually gets all the consequences of its
axioms, and not just the ones it expected on assuming them_ Thus modern man
must take the solipsism, material determinism, and the positivist denial of questions of value along with sharpened senses and their resultant technology, individualism, and democracy. As our Cartesian culture has become more clearly
conscious of all these consequences, the axioms become less attractive, and problems appear with which the axiom system is not qualified to deal. We have, for
instance, a problem with the relation between person and structure-people who
wish to be humanists seem driven to be anarchist, and people who willingly
assume roles in large organizations are thought in existential bad faith. We have
a problem with the evaluation of means-technically, whatever can be done, it
seems, will be done, and the energies of society will be channelled into fields, such
as engineering, in which doing leads exponentially into more doing. We have a
problem with hierarchies; if all men are created equal, then hierarchies are immoral, and yet Sweden and England are finding that actual equalization is a low
and frustrating barbarism which pleases neither the equalized up nor the equalized down . Cartesian individualism has located human value in the private sphere,
forgetting that an earlier age could have used the phrase "homo privatus" for
someone in jail. The resulting value of private time, defined as not·work, has lead
to a capital-intensive economy in which most work is inhuman .
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The verbalism of the Middle Ages, on the other hand, solved the problem of
human roles, was able to humanise hierarchy by making it sacramental, and
assimilated whatever technical process happened to be discovered into the human.
But the Middle Ages was never able to deal with money at a sufficiently high
level of abstraction, doubtless because the general tendency to reify universals
(even Nominalists and skeptics were more realist than we are) led to a com·
modity theory of money. There was neither feudal nor sacramental place for the
middle class-for free city people attached to no lord and no land. In the end, it
was probably printing that blew the Middle Ages apart, by presenting a verbal
culture with such a flood of words, accurately multiplied, titled, and indexed,
that the allegories of meditative reconciliation could no longer assimilate them
all into coherence.
We are never fully conscious of our axioms until it is too late. At the same
time, becoming thus conscious of axioms and their array of good and bad con·
sequences is a good sign that new ones are on the way, of which we will once
again not be fully conscious until it is too late. Nevertheless we must try, both by
looking for our new axioms, and 'by behaving in ways which deny our worn out
ones, to see what we can discover. The problems which we face-the problem of
structures and roles, the problem of means, the problem of hierarchy-are all
problems of understanding and personhood and value. None of them is technological; none of them demands primarily an expert in efficient causes. The public
man who solves them-indeed, the public man who is,disposed even to work on
them-must be a very different sort from the person we now most often produce.
I said at the outset that the public man should be a person who is needed,
effective, and right ; whose life and deeds rise to the decorum of poetry; and
whose knowledge of what to do and be is likely to be based on his ability to
handle images. It may well be that such a person, in a mor or less accidental
way, would run an efficient office, carry out a public works program with efficiency and dispatch, or see to it that dependent children were no more lavishly
supported than the law allows. He might even be marginally interested in such
things. But only as they were means to something else. Thus defined, his primary
energy would be spent on understanding, on interpretation, and on simply trying
to exist as a person in the correct fashion . Acting in this way, he would tend to
solve the problems I have just outlined, and would, if he succeeded, exist as the
incarnation of their solution.
I shall not argue that these problems are important. If it is self-evident that
they are, then it follows that the culture is turning a corner into a new identity,
under new axioms, and needs this new kind of public man. If it is not self·evident
that they are, then the present progress towards Jacques Ellul's Technological
Man will continue. Hitherto the rise and fall of philosophies and cultures implies
that man will not live an absurdity beyond a certain point; I therefore feel some
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confidence in simply presuming that our present absurdities will not grow much
more monstrous, and that the various counter cultures are the incipient beginnings of what is struggling to be born_
ASSUMING that the new public man is needed, how is he to be educated? The
medieval experience is here most instructive. We should not want, nor are
we able, to restore the supremacy of the medieval verbal axioms; we should not
want to repeat their failures with printed word, with middle class, with science
and technolvgy (though this condemnation is overdone, and really unworthy of
our civilization of engineers and tinkerers whose theology, after all, is in rather
parlous state). But the Middle Ages did solve, or in Latin were given the solution
of, the problem of the relation of man to his defining role. The Middle Ages did
manage to develop a social structure which was efficiently hierarchial and at the
same time human. The Middle Ages did make such technology as it had the servant of man, rather man the servant of it-the cathedrals were no mean feats of
engineering, but they also allowed scope for individual craftsmen's eccentricities,
and they were ultimately not engineering but incarnate theology. Finally, the
Middle Ages made a more successful use of the past-of history-than any other
culture I know. Our solutions to these problems will not be medieval, but our
solutions will be more successful if they are fostered by analogy to the medieval
solutions. The education of our public man, then, needs to be an education in
analogical thinking.
As I indicated at the outset, this analogical thinking is already being used most
successfully by the riotous manipulators of television images, by advertising, and
by researchers and technicians who use models and games. Our problem is simply
to find ways of learning and teaching which will encourage this analogical thinking to come to human, rather than perverse or simply technical, results.
Modern images and models tend to be of three kinds, television images, advertising images, and models. Through television, people transform themselves into
images of themselves, preferably at some moment which the audience will accept
as a moment of truth. There is analogy, but it is the analogy of identity in translation. Through advertising, people transfer values from one to the other of
totally disparate images. The connection between sex and cigarettes could probably be explained by a psychiatrist, but it is only the willingness to ignore that
connection which makes it possible to sell the one with pictures implying the
other. Through model-m:lking and gaming, people project wholly or largely artificial analogies into parallel with their problems, hoping for insight. Thus, the
first analogy is an analogy without a difference; the second an analogy with an
infinite difference; and the third is an analogy with only one real term. Medieval
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allegories, on the other hand, tended (except in cases of pure verbal wit) to relate
systematically and in detail two entities which were different, but not utterly dif·
ferent, both of which were historical or reaL Moreover, the terms of medieval
allegory tended to be given in words, though pictures and rituals derived from
these words were also popular. The medieval procedure required the maker of
analogies to confront something that was real and in some way culturally remote;
while modern procedure makes it possible to be entirely artificial, and to stay com·
pletely within one's own culture. When artificial, the analogy is likely to lead to
insights which are inhuman; when completely within one's own culture, it is not
likely to lead to radical insights at alL
History, to the medieval man, was the ordered space on which God's providence
was displayed. Though most of its content was culturally remote, coming from
biblical and classical times, and though that part of history which was medieval
tended to be preserved in words which assimilated it into the classical-biblical
milieu, medieval men were not disposed to recognize the cultural remoteness of
history. They were untroubled by anachronism, and read all history as equally
familiar. At the same time they read it in the inherited words, and so received it
as at once close and distanced; at once as near as yesterday, and as far away as
languages of auctoritas in which it came. We can no longer read history in this
way; archeology, anthropology, and the critical methods of scholarship have made
us irretrievably aware of anachronism. But by combining this positivist knowledge
of historical fact with a sensitivity to sensibility as well, we can relate to the past,
as I have said, with a singleness in doubleness which is quite closely analogous to
the medieval relation.
Since we can, we will. This is the psychic version of the technological tyrrany
of means-if it can be done, it will. What the modern public man needs, more
than anyone thing, as the core and basis of his education, is history-that is, the
collected stories of the exemplary actions of men to which he can relate himself
analogically, and whose stories he can use as analogical models for the solution of
his own problems of meaning and means. What the young are demanding and
cultivating, since positivists and scientists and academics own history and insist
that facts are more important than history, is a whole range of alternative his·
tories, all of them imaginary, which function in the way that history should.
Hallucinatory experiences, science fiction, such fantasy as Tolkien's, some funda·
mentalist religion, black culture, are all ways of putting oneself into experimental
parallel with a mode of human existence which is somehow alien and possible at
the same time. Perhaps, in the end, these sources of analogy will be enough. But
I would feel safer with Heinlein if I could have history as well.
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IN very practical and concrete terms, the education of the public man should
include the following elements. First, he should gain a thorough knowledge
of at least two cultures other than his own, one contemporary, one long dead. By
other than his own, I mean far enough distant to be based on entirely different
axioms. Contemporary cultures now would have to be oriental or primitive; soon
the global village might make genuinely different ones extinct. For culture of the
past, any era would do before the Renaissance. Obviously, because the human element in this education would be all-important, and because man is the animal
which talks, learning these two cultures would include gaining fluency in their
languages. Second, he should serve an on-the-job apprenticeship to some public
figure capable of being for him a teacher, a model, and a patron, combining functional and human significance. Third, he should be encouraged to cultivate in
himself what already seems to be of growing importance in our values and
thought patterns, that is, the ability to use analogies in order to gain insight. If
he does this, he will necessarily deal with his analogy cultures as if they were
literature, and will prize most highly from them their literary remains. Answeringly, he will tend to behave, and to relate to people, in ways capable of being
taken as parallel to a literary existence. Almost regardless of the disposition of the
public figure under whom he works, this kind of student will learn from him the
same sorts of things he has accustomed himself to learning from his books and
his field studies; if the relationship survives, it will be forced to become more
personal and symbolic, less purely functiona1. 1 0
One final point needs to be made about the education of this model public
man. The piece of the past which he will probably choose to study, if not put off
by the wrong kind of historian operating the wrong kind of fact-grubbing school,
will likely be the Middle Ages, or something remarkably similar. I say this
beca use the general practice of cultures is to move forw~rd by standing on the
piece of the past just before the one which preceeded them, and because the attitudes of the rising generation toward technology, toward the self, and toward
structures of reasoning I call allegorical, are strikingly analogous to medieval ones.
The culture's use of the past, until recently, has involved skipping the Middle
Ages (even the na~e betrays our established attitude-the medieval period was
between two important ages). As the extending culture of the Renaissance, we
stood on classical Greece and Rome. There was an abortive attempt to move forward in the nineteenth century, but it was overwhelmed by the progressive power
of railway executives whose buildings--Old Euston Station in London and Penn
and Grand Central in New York-rivalled the Roman baths in classical and imperial splendor. Two of these three are no more, and the third has been given a
Brobdignagian insult; the step is about to be taken. When the Enlightenment
finally dies, we shall reach for our next future standing in the Middle Ages. As
for the force of the analogy-that contemplating the Middle Ages helps one to
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understand the attitudes and problems beginning to surface In contemporary
culture-it must work by insight or it will not work at all. It has by now seemed
self-evident to a number of people.
It is at least clear to all of us that something is going on, that the center will
not hold, that there is a smell of apocalypse in the air, and there are still some, I
am sure, who weep for the loss of the certainties of 1910, and the loss of the lives
of Dresden. But the real tragedy is not mortality, not even the mortality of fire.
That is universal, and we shall not change it. The real tragedy is not even that
Vonnegut is no Homer, and Dresden no Troy. Not only have we no Alkinoos to
offer consolation; we have the worse guilt of knowing that our stories probably
aren't worth telling, because we have lived not with the heart but with the glands.
When Faulkner said this, he pointed to man 's talking as the least of our consolations, beyond which was his soul, a spirit capable of the high abstractions. I
should like to believe that the time will soon ~ome that spirits capable of the
high abstractions will be found, not only in novels, but also in every area of
public life. Then history, an enterprise requiring the collaboration of providence,
people, and written memory, may once again be
... god's work, weaving ruin there
So it should make a song for men to come.

NOTES

'The Odyssey, tr. Robert Fitzgerald· (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1963), p . .\42,
21 am grateful for this telling phrase to my colleague, Sr. Paton Ryan. Such boredom, confronting Medusa's Hell, is a reminder of the true dimension of omnipotence.
BOne may deny the solipsism, on the basis of a set of axioms which do not include be imply it;
but to' ignore it, assuming the empirical axioms which do imply it , is~ to put ones' self at the
mercy of material isms more mechanical than is good for humanity. Since no axiom is a priori
privileged, prudence suggests avoiding those with perverse or inhuman consequences.
4Erich Auerbach comes closest, in his Literary Language and its Public in Late Latin Antiquity

and in the Middle Ages, and in the monumental Mimesis, but his analyses of style and the
meaning of style relate more to doctr'ine than to the sensibility of the one who holds the
doctrine. According to R. Dragonetti, "Aux frontieres du langage poetique: la conception du

langage poetique dans Ie 'De vulgari e1oquentia' de Dante," Romanica gandensia, 9 (1961),
9-77, Dante defines the literary Italia n which he wishes to cultivate in a way which leads to
much the same effect as my definition of Latin as a living language without native speakers.
But Dante treats the native speakers differently.
5The commentary has never been edited . These excerpts are printed by]. M. Parent, a .p., in

La doctrine de la creation dans Ncole de Chartres (Paris, Ottawa, 1938 ), pp. 124 If,
6W ithin the frame of reference of literary criticism, I deal with these matters of definition at
some length in The Friar as Critic (Nashville, 197 1) . Here there is only room for dogmatism:
Angus Fletcher, in Allegory, tl;e Theor)!. of a Symbolic Mode (Ithaca, 1964), is misled by the
fact that allegory leads to interpretations to claim that its essential feature is reference; C. S.
Lewis, in The Allegory of Love (Oxford, 1953) , is dominated by Coleridgean theories of poetry
and by the famous distinction between fancy and the imagination i he relegates allegory to the
area of verbal trickery or ornament, Michael Murrin, in Veil of Allegory (Chicago, 1969), discusses the relation of allegory to obscurity and to prophecy; his analysis seems to me true and
important, but does not focus on matters useful to my argument here. In the sense in which I
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use the term, allegory is a generalized version of the biblical typology which Jean Danielou
defines in From Shadows to Reality: Studies in tile Biblical T ypology of the Fathers, tf. Wulstan
Hibbard, (Westminister, Md., 1960).
71t can be argued that what John describes is not typical, but is rath er th e best educa tio n the

Middle Ages achieved, and that at the height of its twelfth century renaissance, before there
descended upon western Europe the logic-choppi ng darkness of scholastic barbarism. This is in
a manner true, and the modern fascination of philosophy for linguistic analysis has ana logously
deprived learning of a center at once rigorous and human . At the same tim e, Curtiu s' hostility
to scholasticism may well be overstated . The literary culture of Dante and Chaucer, no t to
men tion such dist inctl y minor professional academics as Robert H o lkot and Nicho las Trevet, is

proof that one could still get a reasonably good grammatical education after 1200.
8[ohannis Saresberiensis Episcopi Camotensis Metaiogicon Libri Ill, ed. C. C. I. Webb (Oxford,
1929), I. 24, pp. 53-58.
'''The Lost T ools of Learning," in The Poetry of Search and the Poetry of Statement (London,
1963), pp. 155-176.
lOIt is interesting to note in this connection that John of Salisbury was apparentl y unable to conceive of a governme ntal abstraction w ith out a person in it. Hans Liebeschiitz notes this fact

twice: "One of the peculiarities of John's political thought [is that he] avoids any idea of a
corporation as the execu tant of political action. In John's mind the State consists simpl y of the
actions of the officials w ho comma nd in the rul er's name, and th e actio ns of the subjects who
react to these commands." Medieval Hum anism in the Life and W ritings of ' olin oj Salisbury

(London, 1950), p. 82; d. p. 6. In genera l terms, one could say that the content of the abstraction was a person. But one should go on to say th at the relation between person and
abstraction is reciprocal-the governm ent is person, but th e person is an anointed king, who is
usuall y at some pains to look roya L Modern British useage preserves this precise poin t, by
insisting on the plural verb for collective nouns : "The government are."
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